The Philippines is cursed by its geography. The region’s geopolitics has placed it in the middle of the US-China strategic competition; more so China’s ambitions.
The West Philippine Sea (WPS) is the modern-day Thermopylae Pass, while our navy’s sailors, coast guardsmen, and fisherfolk are the Spartans. The country is holding the line against China’s eastward onslaught toward the Pacific, on behalf of like-minded states and democracies that share its values and belief in a rules-based international order.
Placing the Philippines in its orbit is essential to Beijing’s maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific; if it is to have effective sea control over the South China Sea (SCS); achieve local sea control over the Bashi Channel if it decides to invade Taiwan via the port of Kaohsiung; and sustain its forces if it successfully establishes basis amid the COFA states in the mid-Pacific.
Beijing’s coercive tactics against the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and local fisherfolk in the WPS have three objectives in mind: break the Filipino government and its citizens’ will; set the country as an example to intimidate the rest of the ASEAN member states; and show to the region that the US is an unreliable ally or security partner.
Following the series of panel discussions during the Manila Dialogue on November 8, questions were posed to the local and international participants to tease out potential pathways for the track-1.5 forum to move forward.
Question 1: Will the ASEAN Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) evolve into a norm-setting institution, which can then set the standards of behavior among the region’s maritime law enforcement agencies? With this in place, the region has a basis for sanction against the Chinese Coast Guard, which has been Beijing’s spearhead for coercion and excessive claims in neighboring EEZs. The second point is, will the ACGF be bold enough to declare China’s fisheries militia as “pirates” or as vessels engaged in “pirate-like behavior?” This paves the way for packaging potential joint patrols as ‘counter-piracy operations’ to suppress the abusive behavior of these vessels against the region’s fisherfolks.
Question 2: As early as 2016, the Philippine Navy (PN) recognized the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) surface force as the most compelling threat against the country’s exercise of sovereignty and sovereign rights. Its asymmetric solution called for the acquisition of India’s land-based Bhramos anti-ship missile system. Given this, will ASEAN member states such as Vietnam, Indonesia, or Malaysia consider acquiring the same weapon system and agree to set up a common ‘kill-chain system’ to provide an anti-access/area denial umbrella over most parts of the SCS? This will restrict the maneuver space of the PLA-N and disrupt its campaign to exert sea control over the entire SCS.
Question 3: The efficacy of the Chinese Coast Guard and the fisheries militia in attaining localized sea control has been proven on May 15, 2024, at Scarbrough Shoal, on June 17, 2024 at the Second Thomas Shoal, and, more recently, at Sabina Shoal during the standoff involving the PCG’s BRP Teresa Magbanua. One of the lessons from the ongoing Ukraine-Russian conflict at the Black Sea is the effectiveness of drones and unmanned systems against a superior naval force. The PN is already looking at developing this capability for its own needs, but will the partner states in the European Union assist the country in setting up a ‘drone factory’ locally? This will allow the PN to possess a sustainable supply of drones for various types of missions for sea denial and localized sea control efforts along the WPS.
Question 4: Will the US extend or even increase the deployment of the Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system in the country? Given its 2,500-kilometer range, it can cover the southern parts of mainland China. Such a system can disrupt China’s campaign plan either for the SCS or along the Taiwan Strait. It will also impact the escalation dominance currently enjoyed by Beijing over Manila, which gives it a latitude of options available in compelling the country to agree to its excessive claims along the WPS. However, will Trump’s assumption of power looming on the horizon, the possibility of a region-wide reduction of US military forces might be on the table.
Question 5: Are states such as Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and South Korea, willing to sit down with the Philippines and start a conversation about an alternative architecture for regional security and economic resiliency? The idea of a Northeast Asia maritime security dialogue is an offshoot of three considerations. First is the reluctance of ASEAN to undertake any meaningful action that could displease Xi Jinping. Second is the limitations of the existing “hub and spokes” system given the current state of the US Navy’s combatant forces and the diversion of its ablest forces to the Middle East. Third is the uncertainty in the region arising from Trump’s impending ascendance to the presidency early next year. The idea is not set in a vacuum. The emergence of the US-Japan-South Korea and the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral arrangements can provide the foundation of such a latticework of partnerships; plus, the existing Philippine-Australian defense cooperation agreement and an impending one with Canada.
Question 6: Are the three other partners of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) — Australia, India, and Japan — willing to step up and establish spheres of cooperation in the different parts of the Indo-Pacific? This is to mitigate the US’ current distraction in Europe and the Middle East, and a more inward-looking posture under Trump. In this construct, Australia together with France will take the cudgels of leading the island-states in the mid-Pacific. In the Indian Ocean, India can work with like-minded states in South Asia; while in East Asia, Japan can collaborate with the Philippines, South Korea, and perhaps even Taiwan.
In these days of adversity, the Philippines and the rest of the region may need to consider out-of-the-box approaches in dealing with a rising China and a host of other non-traditional maritime security concerns. – Rappler.com
This is an excerpt from the remarks of retired Rear Admiral Ong during the Manila Dialogue at the Grand Hyatt Manila Hotel on November 8, 2024.